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Appendix A

The Relationship of Unregulated OTC Derivatives to the Meltdown. It is now accepted
wisdom that it was the non-transparent, poorly capitalized, and almost wholly unregulated overthe-counter (“OTC”) derivatives market that lit the fuse that exploded the highly vulnerable
worldwide economy in the fall of 2008.1 Because tens of trillions of dollars of these financial
products were pegged to the economic performance of an overheated and highly inflated housing
market, the sudden collapse of that market triggered under-capitalized or non-capitalized OTC
derivative guarantees of the subprime housing investments. Moreover, the many undercapitalized
insurers of that collapsing market had other multi-trillion dollar OTC derivatives obligations with
thousands of financial counterparties (through unregulated interest rate, currency, foreign
exchange, and energy derivatives). If a financial institution failed because it could not pay off
some of these obligations, trillions of dollars of interconnected transactions would have also
failed, causing a cascade of collapsing banks throughout the world. It was this potential of
systemic failure that required the United States taxpayer to plug the huge capital hole that a daisy
chain of nonpayments by the world‟s largest financial institutions would have caused, thereby
heading off the cratering of the world‟s economy.2
An Example of the Multi-Trillion Dollar Derivative ―Bets‖ That Had to Be Paid by the
U.S. Taxpayer. The then perfectly lawful “bets” that hedge fund manager John Paulson placed
through this unregulated OTC derivatives market provide but a single example of how that
market collectively misfired and – but for taxpayer bailouts – nearly imploded the world
economy.3 From 2006 to 2007, Mr. Paulson with, inter alia, the assistance of swaps dealers,
purchased synthetic collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”), which were nothing more than the
1

See Ben Moshinsky, Stiglitz says Banks Should Be Banned From CDS Trading, BLOOMBERG.COM (Oct. 12, 2009),
http://noir.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a65VXsI.90hs; Paul Krugman, Op-Ed, Looters in
Loafers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2010, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/19/opinion/19krugman.html?dbk. See generally Alan S. Blinder, The Two Issues
to Watch on Financial Reform — We Need an Independent Consumer Watchdog and Strong Derivatives Regulation.
Industry Lobbyists are Trying to Water Them Down, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 2010, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704133804575197852294753766.html; Henry T. C. Hu, ―Empty
Creditors and the Crisis, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 2009, at A13; MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE
DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010) [hereinafter THE BIG SHORT]; SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE
WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN (2011) [hereinafter 13 BANKERS]; MICHAEL
HIRSH, CAPITAL OFFENSE: HOW WASHINGTON‟S WISE MEN TURNED AMERICA‟S FUTURE OVER TO WALL STREET
(2010) [hereinafter CAPITAL OFFENSE]; BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE: THE
HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2010) [hereinafter ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE]; INSIDE JOB (Sony
Pictures Classics & Representational Pictures 2010); Frontline: The Warning (PBS television broadcast Oct. 20,
2009) [hereinafter The Warning]; FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS
IN THE UNITED STATES xxiv (Jan. 2011), available at http://www.fcic.gov/report [hereinafter FCIC REPORT].
2
See Moshinsky, supra note 1; Krugman, supra note 1; Blinder, supra note 1; Hu, supra note 1; THE BIG SHORT,
supra note 1.
3
Complaint at 2, Securities and Exchange Commission v. Goldman Sachs & Co. and Fabrice Tourre, 2010 U.S.
Dist. Ct. 3229 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2010) (“Undisclosed in the marketing materials and unbeknownst to investors, a
large hedge fund, Paulson & Co. Inc. („Paulson‟), with economic interests directly adverse to investors in the
ABACUS 2007-AC1 CDO, played a significant role in the portfolio selection process. After participating in the
selection of the reference portfolio, Paulson effectively shorted the RMBS portfolio it helped select by entering into
credit default swaps („CDS‟) with [Goldman] to buy protection on specific layers of the ABACUS 2007-AC1 capital
structure. Given its financial short interest, Paulson had an economic incentive to choose RMBS that it expected to
experience credit events in the near future.”) (On July 15, 2010, Goldman Sachs entered into a settlement without
admitting or denying the SEC‟s allegations for the amount of $550 million.)
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purchase of insurance on his selection of weak tranches of subprime residential mortgage-backed
securities that Mr. Paulson himself did not own.4 In other words, through so-called “naked credit
default swaps („CDS‟),” Mr. Paulson effectively bought insurance on his own selection of
subprime investments in which he had no ownership and for which he had no risk, but which he
believed would fail. Since the dawn of the 19th century, it has not been legal to buy insurance on
someone else‟s risk. However, because these “bets” were categorized as OTC derivatives, they
were expressly deregulated as “swaps” by Congressional enactment, and insurance laws were not
applied.
When subprime mortgage borrowers (i.e., those with various degrees of noncreditworthiness) defaulted and could not, as common sense would have suggested, sustain their
mortgages, the tranches that Mr. Paulson insured (but did not own) failed, thereby triggering
highly lucrative payment obligations to Mr. Paulson pursuant to his synthetic CDOs and naked
CDS. Paulson ultimately made about $15 billion on these bets.5
Even though the purchasers of synthetic CDOs, such as Mr. Paulson, “profited
spectacularly from the housing crisis . . . they were not purchasing insurance against anything
they owned. Instead, they merely made side bets on the risks undertaken by others.”6 In fact,
because synthetic CDOs mimicked insurance, those who were “insured” through synthetic CDOs
were only required to sustain their multi- trillion dollar bets with insurance-like “premiums,”
i.e., they were only required to pay about two percent of the total amount insured.7
Moreover, as has been widely demonstrated, investors “creating” their synthetic bets that
the subprime market would fail often repeatedly insured against the same weak subprime
tranches, i.e., many weak subprime tranches were “bet” to fail multiple times.8 In essence,
therefore, once a borrower defaulted on a mortgage, the loss in the real economy was
exponentially multiplied by the many side bets placed on whether that borrower would default.
Mr. Paulson‟s investments are reflective of trillions of dollars bet on the subprime
market, and the astronomical amounts owed to the holders of this unregulated “insurance” of the
subprime market serve as a microcosm of the worldwide financial crisis.9
Most importantly, the “insurers” of the subprime market (some of the most prominent
financial institutions in the world) were not required to have capital to sustain their insurance or
to post collateral to ensure their payments. (Had these investments been governed by insurance
or gaming laws, those betting that subprime mortgages would be paid would have been required
to have adequate capital to ensure payments if the bet were lost.) And, when the “insurers” were
“surprised” to find that those without creditworthiness could not pay their mortgages, they did
not have the ability to pay off their indebtedness to the holders of synthetic CDOs. However,
what should have been a zero-sum game was converted from a lose-lose game into a win-win
4

Id.
Svea Herbst-Bayliss and Kevin Lim, Paulson reassures on Goldman role, REUTERS (April 21, 2010), available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/21/us-goldman-paulson-redemptionsidUSTRE63K0C620100421?pageNumber=1.
6
FCIC REPORT, supra note 1, at 195.
7
See THE BIG SHORT, supra note 1, at 51.
8
See id.
9
See generally THE BIG SHORT, supra note 1; see also INSIDE JOB, supra note 1.
5
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situation, i.e., the Mr. Paulsons of this world only got paid because “insurers” were subsidized by
the taxpayer so that the “casinos” could make payment on the bets. Unlike regular gambling, no
gambler lost – except the perfectly innocent bystanders: the U.S. taxpayer.10
As it now stands, the world is attempting to dig itself out of the worst financial crisis
since the Great Depression of the 1930‟s – a task now aggravated, inter alia, by the burden of
escalating energy and food commodity prices. Dozens of studies suggest that even those
escalating commodity prices may very well be aided by betting on the upward direction of those
prices through passive investments originated by U.S. financial institutions using unregulated
OTC derivatives.11
Dodd-Frank Provides the Tools to Protect the U.S. Taxpayer. Title VII of the DoddFrank Act12 would make it very difficult to repeat the kind of undercapitalized, non-transparent,
and economy-busting “betting” mentioned above. That statute, if properly implemented, (1)
requires all major players to have adequate capital to enter the market to sustain their potentially
huge obligations; (2) requires that almost all of these kinds of investments be collateralized by
counterparties; (3) requires almost all of these investments to be guaranteed and properly
margined by clearing facilities, which, in turn, are subject to strict federal regulation and
oversight; (4) requires all of these transactions to be publicly recorded and, in many instances,
traded on public exchanges or exchange-like environments; and (5) collectively places the
CFTC, the SEC, and the members of the Financial Stability Oversight Council in a position to
have full transparency of these kinds of investments with an eye to preventing the kind of
systemic risk that threatened the world economy in the fall of 2008.
It must be emphasized that Title VII exempts from the clearing requirement commercial
end users.13 Moreover, the CFTC and SEC have repeatedly said that uncleared swaps used by

10

See THE BIG SHORT, supra note at 1, at 256.
See Commodity Markets Oversight Coalition, EVIDENCE OF THE IMPACT OF COMMODITY SPECULATION BY
ACADEMICS, ANALYSTS AND PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS (2011), available at
http://www.nefiactioncenter.com/PDF/evidenceonimpactofcommodityspeculation.pdf; see also KENNETH J.
SINGLETON, GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS PROFESSOR, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, INVESTOR FLOWS AND THE 2008
BOOM/BUST IN OIL PRICES (March 23, 2011), available at http://www.stanford.edu/~kenneths/.
12
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 (2010).
13
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 723(a)(3) (2010)
(“Clearing Transition Rules – (A) Swaps entered into before the date of the enactment of this subsection are exempt
from the clearing requirements of this subsection if reported pursuant to paragraph (5)(A); (B) Swaps entered into
before application of the clearing requirement pursuant to this subsection are exempt from the clearing requirements
of this subsection if reported pursuant to paragraph (5)(B).”).
11
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commercial end users will be exempt from margin requirements both for the commercial end
user and for the swap dealer selling the hedging vehicle.14
Moreover, the statute expressly exempts from regulation all swaps in existence before the
statute passed, as well as swaps executed before final rules are put in place.15 That means until
the CFTC acts, hundreds of millions of dollars of swaps will continue to be unregulated with no
provision for capital adequacy or transparency. This latter factor, in and of itself, justifies the
timetable established in Dodd-Frank for implementation of the statute, which the CFTC is
diligently attempting to follow. Until final rules are adopted, the American taxpayer, consumer
and retiree are exposed to the same regulatory inadequacies that caused the fall 2008 credit crisis
to begin with.
One of the most important sections in Title VII of Dodd-Frank is Section 737 on Position
Limits.16 It is designed to ban excessive speculation from the derivatives market, i.e., ban that
speculation which exceeds the need for liquidity by commercial hedgers in the commodity
markets. The CFTC, as congressionally mandated, is currently in the process of implementing
Section 737 through the rulemaking process and proposed rules on position limits on January 26,
2011.17
However, in attempting to properly implement Section 737, the CFTC has faced massive
opposition. Opponents have argued that Section 737 is not necessary to prevent volatility in
commodity prices. First, as I have stated in my comment letter in response to the proposed
position limits rules,18 Section 737 does not afford the CFTC discretion regarding the
implementation of position limits. Rather, it imposes the statutory obligation to set position
limits with the goal of limiting excessive speculation. In drafting this section, Congress
14

Written Testimony of Gary Gensler, Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Hearing Before the
U.S. House Committee on Agricultural to Review Implementation of Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Acton, February 10, 2011, available at
http://www.cftc.gov/pressroom/speechestestimony/opagensler-68.html (“Transactions involving non-financial
entities do not present the same risk to the financial system as those solely between financial entities. Consistent
with this, proposed rules on margin requirements should focus only on transactions between financial entities rather
than those transactions that involve non-financial end-users.”) [hereinafter “Gensler Testimony”]; Written
Testimony of Mary Schapiro, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, Hearing Before the U.S. House
Financial Services Committee on Implementation of Titles VII and VIII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, February 15, 2011, available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2011/ts021511mls.htm (“in proposing margin rules, we will be mindful both of
the importance of security-based swaps as hedging tools for commercial end users and also of the need to set
prudent risk rules for dealers in these instruments.”) [hereinafter “Schapiro Testimony”].
15
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 739 (2010) (“Unless
specifically reserved in the applicable swap, neither the enactment of the Wall Street Transparency and
Accountability Act of 2010, nor any requirement under that Act or an amendment made by that Act, shall constitute
a termination event, force majeure, illegality, increased costs, regulatory change, or similar event under a swap
(including any related credit support arrangement) that would permit a party to terminate, renegotiate, modify,
amend, or supplement 1 or more transactions under the swap.”).
16
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 737 (2010).
17
Position Limits for Derivatives, 76 Fed. Reg. 4752 (January 26, 2011).
18
See Comment Letter by Michael Greenberger, Professor, University of Maryland School of Law, Director, Center
for Health and Homeland Security, to David Stawick, Secretary, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Position
Limits for Derivatives (March 28, 2011), available at
http://www.michaelgreenberger.com/files/Greenberger_PL_comment_letter.pdf.
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purposefully replace the word “may” in the House version of the Dodd-Frank Act19 with
“shall,”20 to “strengthen confidence in trader position limits on physically deliverable
commodities as a way to prevent excessive speculative trading.”21
Those who oppose position limits argue that there is a lack of empirical data
demonstrating that excessive speculation has unnecessarily and dramatically increased the price
of energy and agricultural commodities. For example, Terry Duffy of the CME Group stated
during the March 3, 2011 hearing before the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and
Forestry that “there‟s been absolutely no evidence that [speculators] have anything to do with the
effect of price whether it comes from an academic, whether it comes from a government study or
anything else. So just want to put that clear.”22 This is simply incorrect. Even if, for argument‟s
sake, the imposition of position limits is discretionary, many company/commercial end-users,
including, inter alia, Starbucks, Hershey, Lindt & Spruengli, and Delta Airlines, have now come
forward demonstrating that the futures market is in complete disarray because of excessive
speculation.23 The Commodity Markets Oversight Coalition, an independent, non-partisan and
non-profit alliance of groups that represents commodity-dependent industries, businesses and
19

The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2009).
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 737 (2010).
21
Official website of House Committee on Agriculture, House Passes Peterson-Frank Amendment to Strengthen
Regulation of Over-the-Counter Derivatives, December 10, 2009, available at
http://democrats.agriculture.house.gov/press/PRArticle.aspx?NewsID=207.
22
See Transcript of Implementation of Title VII of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Hearing
Before the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition & Forestry, 112th Cong. (March 3, 2011) (Statement of Terry
Duffy, Executive Chairman, CME Group); see also e.g., in the comment letter submitted by SIFMA Asset
Management Group, which is comprised primarily of Chief Operating Officers and other senior executives at asset
management firms, argued: “The CFTC should delay adoption of position limits until an „appropriateness‟
determination can be made. Currently, there lacks insufficient evidence to suggest that speculation is affecting
commodities markets.” Comment Letter by Timothy W. Cameron, Esq., Managing Director, Asset Management
Group of Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) to David Stawick, Secretary, Commodity
Futures Trading Commission, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking – Position Limits for Derivatives, March 28, 2011,
available at http://www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id=24137 (emphasis added).
23
See e.g., Howard Schultz, Chief Executive Officer of Starbucks, Inc., recently stated: “I‟ve been in this business
for 30 years. I can tell you unequivocally with every coffee farmer and resource that we talk to in which we have
decades of relationships, we cannot identify a supply problem in the world where we‟re buying coffee. So one
question is, „why are coffee prices going up?‟ and in addition to that, „why is every commodity price going up at the
same time?‟ Why is cotton, corn, wheat, why? And I think what‟s going on is financial engineering; that financial
speculators have come into the commodity markets and drove these prices up to historic levels and as a result of that
the consumer is suffering.” Josh Garrett, Starbucks CEO Points to Speculation as Cause of Rising Commodity
Prices, HEATINGOIL.COM (April 6, 2011), available at http://www.heatingoil.com/blog/starbucks-ceo-points-tospeculation-as-cause-of-rising-commodity-prices0406/; see also e.g., The world‟s largest chocolate maker, Hershey
Co. have announced that they have increased the price to “offset the higher costs of ingredients such as cocoa and
sugar which has doubled in cost over the last year.” Moreover, Lindt & Spruengli, the Swiss chocolate maker, said
that “they may well increase their prices to consumers in the second half of the year to offset the higher costs of
Cocoa prices that the company have incurred after Cocoa costs rose following financial speculation and postelection violence in the Ivory Coast.” Edward Buckley, Hershey’s Raise Their Prices By Nearly 10% To Offset
Rising Costs, NEWSDAILYBRIEF.COM (April 1, 2011), available at http://newsdailybrief.com/hersheys-raise-theirprices-by-nearly-10-percent-to-offset-rising-costs/353628/ (emphasis added); Jim Spencer and Dee DePass, As we
pay more at the pump, oil trading curbs still on hold, STAR TRIBUNE (March 20, 2011) (quoting Ben Hirst, Chief
Counsel, Delta Air Lines: “[S]peculators try to anticipate what other speculators are going to do, and the market
overreacts. It‟s not as though there‟s a shortage of product that caused the price to move up. It‟s a casino process
with financial players betting on where the price is going to go. But it has an effect on [current] prices.”).
20
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end-users, has also adopted the position that commodity prices defy market fundamentals due to
excessive speculation.
Notably, during the March 31, 2011 hearing before the House Committee on Natural
Resources, three out of the four panelists (Bill Graves, CEO and President of American Trucking
Association and former Republican Governor of Kansas, Don Shawcroft, President of Colorado
Farm Bureau, and Michael J.Fox, Executive Director of Gasoline & Automotive Service Dealers
of America, Inc.) supported the need to regulate excessive speculation with strict aggregate
position limits as required by Section 737 across all derivatives markets and to provide necessary
funding to the CFTC to implement that strict anti-speculative regime.24 In particular, Mr. Fox
told the Committee: “The fastest way to six dollar retail gasoline price is to not fully fund the
CFTC and not impose the Dodd/Frank regulations. That„s the fastest way to get to six dollar
gasoline.”25
Overbroad exemptions from speculative position limits are wholly unjustified, as it has
been repeatedly proven that the swap dealer exemptions have allowed those Too Big to Fail
banks to enter into excessive speculative transactions in the commodities market. Specifically,
the bi-partisan Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Report on Excessive
Speculation in the Wheat Market, which was released on July 24, 2009, found that “four swap
dealers selling index-related swaps currently operate with hedge exemptions that allow them to
hold much larger positions on the Chicago wheat futures market than would otherwise apply
under the CFTC‟s speculative position limits.”26 Allowing these kinds of exemptions to continue
would drive excessive speculation in all commodity markets, which is why we are in an
inflationary food and energy bubble at this time.
We Are Not Home Free Yet. There is now a substantial question whether Title VII of
Dodd-Frank will be properly implemented because of resistance by big banks and other financial
institutions. According to the Comptroller of the Currency, five big Wall Street banks have
controlled 98% of the existing (pre-Dodd-Frank) OTC derivatives market, thereby necessitating,
for example, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice to intervene in one of the
critically important CFTC and SEC proposed rulemakings concerning ownership of the major
new financial institutions created by Dodd-Frank. The big banks want to keep these institutions
within their control. Needless to say, if properly implemented, the huge profits of these and other
banks will be diminished by the competition that a transparent market brings, in the words of
Dodd-Frank, “free and open access” to what would be highly competitive derivatives markets.
While each argument advanced by swaps dealers must be analyzed on its own merits,
there can be no mistake that a unifying rationale for minimizing the impact of Dodd-Frank, either
implicitly or explicitly, is that we are now out of the financial crisis and there is no need for
change. Therefore, it is suggested that as much of the status quo ante as can be preserved should
now be left in place.
24

See Harnessing American Resources to Create Job and Addressing Gasoline Prices: Impacts on Business and
Families Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Natural Resources, 112th Cong. (March 31, 2011).
25
Id.
26
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, EXCESSIVE SPECULATION IN THE WHEAT MARKET 37 (June 24, 2009) [hereinafter
“Wheat Report”].
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A subsidiary argument is that if Dodd-Frank is fully enforced, it will be a job killer.
However, as shown above, the undercapitalized casino that unregulated derivatives fostered in
the subprime housing market was the ultimate job and pension killer. The misery created by that
unregulated market often gets lost in Wall Street talking points. Moreover, the economic
gambling infrastructure built before Dodd-Frank around subprime mortgages exists, e.g., for
prime mortgages, commercial mortgages, student loans, auto and credit card debt.
We are presently in a jobless “recovery.” Moreover, the shock of rapidly escalating
energy and food prices, as well as threatened defaults by municipalities and European Union
sovereign states, can either individually or collectively create economic dislocations akin to that
experienced in the fall of 2008. For example, there is almost certainly an untold number of
grossly undercapitalized naked CDS on municipal and sovereign obligations. If there are
widespread defaults in those areas, an untold number of undercapitalized “insurance” guarantees
will be triggered.
The loss of profits of “Too Big to Fail” financial institutions, which have fully recovered
and may be stronger and bigger now than before the meltdown, must be balanced against the
well being of the American consumer, worker and taxpayer.27 Rejecting Dodd-Frank on the
assumption that all is now well is a dangerous strategy to follow legislatively or at the regulatory
level.
There is another concern that the implementation of Dodd-Frank would add significant
operation costs to commercial end users. However, as shown above, the Act contains a statutory
“end-user” exception to ease the burden on businesses using swaps to mitigate risk associated
with their commercial activities. 28 The legislative intent shows that the drafters of the Act
unequivocally share this goal as well.29 Furthermore Chairman Gensler and Chairwoman
Shapiro have said repeatedly that end users will not have to post margin for uncleared swaps and
that the swaps dealer counterparty will not have to post margin.30 Simply, this is a case of
commercial end-users not taking "yes" for an answer to their worries about having to post
collateral for uncleared swaps.
Whatever new costs Dodd-Frank imposes (and those costs are greatly exaggerated by
those seeking to deflate regulation) are minimal compared to the dire economic havoc that might
be caused by under-regulation, especially when Congress is now almost devoid of “stimulus
bullets” to repair future economic ills.
Funding for the CFTC and SEC. Severely hampering the CFTC‟s and SEC‟s ability to
implement Title VII of Dodd-Frank are their challenging financial and staffing conditions. With
27

Karen Weise, Banks 'Too Big to Fail' Could Get Bigger: Federal agencies putting mortgage and derivative
reforms into force are writing rules that seem to have a big-bank bias, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (April 7, 2011),
available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_16/b4224025246331.htm.
28
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 723 (2010).
29
See Letter from Christopher Dodd, Chairman, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs &
Blanche Lincoln, Chairman, Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, to Barney Frank, Chairman,
Financial Services Committee & Colin Peterson, Chairman, Committee on Agriculture, (June 30, 2010), available at
http://www.wilmerhale.com/files/upload/June%2030%202010%20Dodd_Lincoln_Letter.pdf (explaining that the
end-user exception is “for those entities that are using the swaps market to hedge or mitigate commercial risk.”).
30
See Gensler Testimony, supra note 14; see also Schapiro Testimony, supra note 14.
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regard to the CFTC, that agency‟s gross underfunding makes performing its new and complex
functions under Dodd-Frank “a herculean task.”31 Under the new regulations, the CFTC must
examine a voluminous amount of data and information encompassing transactions that number in
the millions.32 An $11 million slash in the technology budget has forced the agency to cease
developing a new program that would scan the overwhelming number of trades to detect
suspicious trading. Moreover, the potential long-term effects of insufficient funding is severe;
operating under its current budget will mean that applications, findings, and enforcement
required by the new law would languish.33 As Commissioner Bart Chilton aptly warns, “Without
the funding, we could once again risk another calamitous disintegration.”34 Lack of funds not
only shortchanges the Commission, but it also risks another widespread financial crisis.
In this regard, the CFTC lacks an adequate number of personnel to perform its increased
regulatory duties. From 1999 to 2007, the agency shrunk from 567 full-time equivalents
(“FTEs”) to 437. By 2010, the number of FTEs had risen to 650, only a 30% increase in the
number of personnel since the agency‟s establishment in 1975. Chairman Gary Gensler
estimates that he needs an additional 400 people to meet the challenges of regulating the multitrillion dollar derivatives markets.35 As Barbara Roper of the Consumer Federation of America
has noted, for example, the “draconian cuts” of the House of Representatives‟ proposed budget
would “decimate that tiny agency without making any meaningful inroads in the federal
deficit.”36 Even the relatively fiscally conservative Financial Times has recently editorialized
that the SEC and CFTC deserve the funding levels that were promised to prevent a future
meltdown through proper implementation of Dodd-Frank.
It is one thing to attack Dodd-Frank frontally by seeking deregulatory action either
through legislation or weakened rules. There can be little doubt, however, that starving financial
regulatory agencies dependent upon appropriations is a de facto rescission of Dodd-Frank. It asks
Americans to face yet another crisis under the guise of budget cuts – a crisis that may “the next
time” drag the United States and the world into the next Great Depression.
In making this point, I also want to commend the CFTC for its heroic work in meeting
the necessarily rigorous deadlines imposed by Dodd-Frank for well over 60 new rules. I spent 25
years in a private law practice heavily devoted to rulemaking advocacy, and then involvement in
the judicial review of those rules in virtually every federal circuit court of appeals in the country
31

Ben Protess, Regulators Decry Proposed Cuts in C.F.T.C. Budget, N.Y. TIMES (February 24, 2011) (quoting
CFTC Commissioner Michael Dunn), available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/02/24/regulators-decryproposed-c-f-t-c-budget-cuts/?ref=todayspaper.
32
Jean Eaglesham and Victoria McGrane, Budget Rift Hinders CFTC, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 25, 2011).
33
See Transcript of the Congressional Hearing to Review Implementation of Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act before the H. Comm. on Agriculture (Feb. 15, 2011) (statement of
Terry Duffy, Executive Chairman, CEM Group).
34
See Statement of Bart Chilton, Commissioner, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Risky Business
(February 24, 2011), available at
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/chiltonstatement022411.html.
35
Ben Protess and Mac William Bishop, At Center of Derivatives Debate, a Gung-Ho Regulator, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
10, 2011), available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/02/10/at-center-of-debate-over-derivatives-a-gung-horegulator/.
36
See Statement of Barbara Roper, Director of Investment Protection, Consumer Federation of America, Feb. 14,
2011.
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and in the United States Supreme Court. I was also very proud of the many rules that were
promulgated by the CFTC while I was the Director of the Division of Trading and Markets.
However, the hard and productive work performed by the CFTC in implementing Dodd-Frank,
especially with its small staff, is extraordinary. The quality of that work also meets the highest
standards of public service. This subcommittee as one of the key oversight bodies for the CFTC
should be very proud of this effort. The agency has more than demonstrated that it will be a
vigilant protector of the important markets it now oversees if it receives the financial support it
needs from this Congress.
This testimony is further supported in detail by my March 3, 2011 written testimony
before the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry at pp. 6 to 25;37 my March
28, 2011 comment letter to the CFTC on Position Limits for Derivatives;38 my published article
in the University of Maryland School of Law‟s Journal of Business and Technology Law;39 and a
series of my previously published articles and testimony delivered to Congress and to the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission.40 Links to those documents may be found in the margin.

37

Written Testimony of Michael Greenberger, Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition
and Forestry Regarding the Implementation of Title VII of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(March 3, 2011), available at http://www.michaelgreenberger.com/files/110303Greenberger_Senate_Ag_Testimony2.pdf.
38
Comment Letter by Michael Greenberger, Professor, University of Maryland School of Law, Director, Center for
Health and Homeland Security, to David Stawick, Secretary, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Position
Limits for Derivatives (March 28, 2011), available at
http://www.michaelgreenberger.com/files/Greenberger_PL_comment_letter.pdf.
39
Overwhelming a Financial Regulatory Black Hole with Legislative Sunlight: Dodd-Frank’s Attack on Systemic
Economic Destabilization Caused by An Unregulated Multi-Trillion Dollar Derivatives Market, 6 J. Bus. & Tech. L.
127 (April 2011), available at http://works.bepress.com/michael_greenberger/41/.
40
Derivatives in the Crisis and Financial Reform, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FINANCIAL CRISES, OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS HANDBOOK (Gerald Epstein & Martin Wolfson eds., forthcoming 2012); Is Our Economy Safe?
A Proposal for Assessing the Success of Swaps Regulation under the Dodd-Frank Act, in THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL
REFORM: WILL IT WORK? HOW WILL WE KNOW? (Roosevelt Institute 2010), available at
http://works.bepress.com/michael_greenberger/34; Out of the Black Hole: Regulatory Reform of the Over-theCounter Derivatives Market, in MAKE MARKETS BE MARKETS 99 (Roosevelt Institute 2010), available at
http://works.bepress.com/michael_greenberger/35/; Out of the Black Hole: Reining in the Reckless Market in Overthe-Counter Derivatives, AMERICAN PROSPECT (2010), available at
http://works.bepress.com/michael_greenberger/37; and Written Testimony of Michael Greenberger, Hearing Before
the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Regarding The Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis (June 30, 2010),
available at http://www.fcic.gov/hearings/pdfs/2010-0630-Greenberger.pdf.
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